Tap on, Tap off: Onscreen Keyboards & Mobile Password Entry

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National Institute of Standards and Technology U.S. Department of Commerce

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Tap on, Tap Off: Onscreen Keyboards & Mobile Password Entry



Disclaimer

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Outline

- Who we are
- Purpose
- Usability background
- Password security background
- Prior work
- Current methodology and results

Conclusions

Kristen Greene

Joshua Franklin

Information Security Engineer NIST Computer Security Division George Mason University Cellular Security Mobile Security Voting Security


Cognitive Scientist NIST Information Access Division Rice University Usable Security Computational Cognitive Modeling Voting Usability

John Kelsey

Cryptographer NIST Computer Security Division University of Missouri Columbia Symmetric Cryptography PRNGs Voting Security

The Problem

6n04%Ei'Hm3V is 23 taps



EHVnim6043%' is 15 taps



Using Keyboard from Android Lollipop

Purpose

- Explore current state of usability and security metrics for passwords
- Assign strength metrics to passwords for which we already had usability metrics
 - How much entropy is lost as a result of permuting passwords to be easier to enter on mobile devices?

Usability Background Tap On, Tap Off

Usability


- Context of use
- Effectiveness
- Efficiency
- Satisfaction

Usability: ISO 9241

 "The extent to which a product can be used by specified users to achieve specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction in a specified context of use."

Usability: Context of Use

- "Users, tasks, equipment (hardware, software and materials), and the physical and social environments in which a product is used." [ISO 9241]
 - Mobile vs. desktop context



Usability: Effectiveness

- "Accuracy and completeness with which users achieve specified goals." [ISO 9241]
- Generally measured via error rates
 - Password entry errors



Usability: Efficiency

- "Resources expended in relation to the accuracy and completeness with which users achieve specified goals." [ISO 9241]
- Generally measured via time on task
 - Password entry time
 - Number of keystrokes (taps)



Usability: Satisfaction

- "Freedom from discomfort, and positive attitudes towards the use of the product." [ISO 9241]
- Generally measured via standardized or customized questionnaires



Usability & Security Parallels

- Confidentiality Effectiveness
- Integrity
 Efficiency
- Availability Satisfaction

Password Security Background Tap On, Tap Off

Attacks on Passwords

- Password guessing
 - Brute force

Intelligent guessing with these classes of attacks

We are only concerned

- Eavesdropping
- Social Engineering
- Physical attacks

Password Strength

- Password strength is often expressed in terms of entropy
 - Note: Entropy is at most only loosely related to the use of the term in thermodynamics.
- Entropy was originally defined by Claude Shannon in the 1950s

Password Metric Groups

- Two password metric groups
- Classified by how a password is created
 - user generated passwords
 - system generated passwords (a.k.a. randomly generated)
- Password metrics measure only one of these groups

Randomly Generated Password Metrics

- Shannon entropy formula: H = log₂ (B^L)
 - H = total entropy
 - B = number of characters to choose from
 - L = password length
- Kuo, 2006] uses modified Shannon entropy

Shannon Entropy Examples

Password
5c2'Qe
3.bH1o
a7t?C2#
m3)61fHw
p4d46*3TxY
q80 <u c2mv<="" td=""></u>
d51)u4;X3wrf
6n04%Ei'Hm3V
m#o)fp^2aRf207
4i_55fQ\$2Mnh30

Entropy	Estimate
39.33	
39.33	
45.88	
52.44	
65.55	
65.55	
78.66	
78.66	
91.76	
91.76	

User Generated Password Metrics

- "Guessing entropy"
 - Estimate of the average amount of work required to guess the password of a selected user
 - Uses Shannon entropy as a foundation
 - "Measures" password strength based on a ruleset

User Generated Password Metrics

- "Min-entropy"
 - Difficulty of guessing the easiest single password to guess in the population
 - NIST specifies dictionary tests and password histories as heuristics to ensure at least 10 bits of entropy

800-63 Entropy Heuristic

- From NIST SP 800-63-2:
 - Ist character = 4 bits per character
 - 2nd thru 8th = 2 bits per character
 - 9th thru 20th = 1.5 bits per character
 - 21+ = 1 bit per character
 - Upper + lower + non-alphabetic = 6 bit bonus
 - Dictionary check = 6 bit bonus

800-63 Min-Entropy Ruleset

- Search a dictionary of at least 50,000 words for the password
 - If found, reject password
- Passwords that are detectable permutations of the username are not allowed

Our Research & Results Tap On, Tap Off

Prior Work Tap On, Tap Off


Prior Work

- Recent behavioral study on mobile password entry
- Participants had to learn, input, and recall 10 random passwords
- Onscreen keyboard switching significantly increased input time and introduced errors [Greene, Gallagher, Stanton, & Lee, 2014]


Measurement Granularity

- Password level
 - The entire password is either accepted or fails
- Character level
 - Multiple types of character errors (e.g., transposition, deletion, substitution)
- Important to look at the nature and number of errors users make when inputting passwords

Tiny Keyboards = More Errors



Tiny Keyboards = More Errors



Onscreen Keyboards




q	W ²	e³	r	t	у ⁶	u ⁷	i	o°p°
а	S	d	f	g	h	j	k	Т
±	Z	х	С	V	b	n	m	
?123	,							e
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
Screen Depth 1

WERTYU ΙΟ Q SDFGHJK А Z X C V B N M $\widehat{}$ $\langle \times \rangle$.?123 space return

Screen Depth 2



Screen Depth 3



Current Work Tap On, Tap Off

Methodology


- Defined a password permutation
 - Divided characters in password into "classes"
 - Uppercase (U), lowercase (L), numbers (N), and symbols (S)
 - Group similar characters together
- Example:
 - Sc2'Qe is permuted to Qce52'

Permutation and Tap Counts

Original Password	Permuted Password	Length	Taps: Original, Permuted	Keyboard Changes: Original, Permuted	Taps Saved
5c2'Qe	Qce52'	6	11, 8	4, 1	3
m3)61fHw	Hmfw361)	8	11, 10	2, 1	
q80 <u c2mv<="" td=""><td>UCqmv802<!--</td--><td>10</td><td>19, 15</td><td>7, 3</td><td>4</td></td></u>	UCqmv802 </td <td>10</td> <td>19, 15</td> <td>7, 3</td> <td>4</td>	10	19, 15	7, 3	4
6n04%Ei'Hm3V	EHVnim6043%'	12	24, 17	9, 2	7
m#o)fp^2aRf207	Rmofpaf2207#)^	14	24, 19	10, 4	6

Password Collisions

 Multiple unique passwords can permute to the same password:



Our Results Tap On, Tap Off

Experiment 1: Fan-Out

How many passwords collide with the same userfriendly password?

How Many Collisions?

Length	10 th Percentile	90 th Percentile	Average
6	120	180	159
8	840	1680	1329
10	5040	25200	12659
12	27720	277200	132492
14	360360	3153150	1438513
16	2402400	40360320	17187712
18	24504480	514594080	208414540
20	221707200	6518191680	2327087101

Experiment 2: Entropy Loss

How much entropy is lost by permuting passwords?

How Much Entropy Is Lost?

Length	10 th Percentile	90 th Percentile	Average	Additional Letters
6	6.9	7.5	7.3	2
8	9.7	10.7	10.4	3
10	12.3	14.6	13.6	3
12	14.8	18.1	17.0	4
14	18.0	21.6	20.4	5
16	21.5	25.0	24.0	6
18	24.5	28.9	27.6	6
20	27.9	32.6	31.2	7

Experiment 3: All-Lowercase

How much additional password length would we need to just change over to all lowercase letters?

What About All Lowercase?

Complex Password	All-Lowercase	Extra Letters
6	9	3
8	12	4
10	14	4
12	17	5
14	20	6
16	23	7
18	25	7
20	28	8

q80<U/C2mv VS

dmstpjnwqiwqok

Unholster your phones and type this: m#o)fp^2aRf207

Now type this: Rmofpaf2207#)^

Recap

- Entering complex passwords on mobile devices is difficult
- Our password permutation makes it easier
 - We precisely measure the security loss
 - Fixed by adding a couple extra characters

Conclusions

- Device constraints matter
- Id password policies play badly with new devices
- Both usability and security must be considered

Code

- https://github.com/usnistgov/PasswordMetrics
- https://github.com/usnistgov/DataVis

Questions?

- For additional research, visit NIST's Information Technology Laboratory:
 - Kristen Greene Information Access Division nist.gov/itl/iad
 - John Kelsey
 Joshua Franklin
 Computer Security Division
 csrc.nist.gov

Acknowledgements

- Cathryn Ploehn
- Andrew Rukhin
- Jim Filliben

References

[Greene, Gallagher, Stanton, & Lee, 2014] I Can't Type That! P@\$\$w0rd Entry on Mobile Devices. In Human Aspects of Information Security, Privacy, and Trust, Lecture Notes in Computer Science Volume 8533, 2014, pp 160-171.

[ISO 9241] Ergonomic requirements for office work with visual display terminals (VDTs) -- Part 11: Guidance on usability.

[Kuo, 2006] Human Selection of Mnemonic Phrase-based Passwords, CUPS 2006.

[NIST SP 800-63-2] Burr et al, Electronic Authentication Guideline, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2013.

[Shannon, 1948] C. E. Shannon, "A mathematical Theory of Communication, 1948.

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
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Extras Tap On, Tap Off


Data Viz Tool Tap On, Tap Off


Prior NIST Tool

- Cathryn Ploehn's SURF (Summer Undergraduate Research Fellowship) project
- Shows usability and security metrics side-by-side for original and permuted passwords
- Multiple levels of granularity
- Filtering options
- https://github.com/usnistgov/DataVis



Display	
Raw Score Amount of Change	
Filter	
Password length: 6 - 14	_
# letters: 2 - 10	
# numerics: 1 - 8	
# special chars: 0 - 2	
Rank by	
Lowest Permuted Entropy Lowest Permuted LPD Score	
Show/Hide Columns	
Symbol start Number of Chunks Number of Characters Unsentence-like capitalization Mixed Character String Pronounceable Total LP Difficulty # of Desktop keystrokes # of Android Keystrokes # of iPad Keystrokes entropy	





Symbol start Number of Chunks Number of Characters Unsentence-like capitalization Mixed Character String

of Desktop keystrokes

Total LP Difficulty

Pronounceable

of Android Keystrokes # of iPad Keystrokes

entropy

New entropy

New # of iPad Keystrokes # of Android Keystrokes New # of Desktop Keystrokes Permuted LP Difficulty New Pronounceable New Mixed Character String New Unsentence-like capitalization New Number of Characters New Number of Chunks New Symbol Start

> VLv1!_ Jtr41! VWq856 Xon5;* Hmou3+ WQi22) ARg86: Ydn4: } NGc8> QT18^-Usp7\$] Rpau7* Qce52` Do464& Qqq3:-Hbo31. KIf121 JLv10] Iqn1!+ Voc00 Qc66=& Wbu1<' Auj4+^ Bt02/[Of70)(CRi65% Fgy3!\ JNr6]+ Oyxcg6{ Iy712;)


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LPD per-rule and total scores

keystrokes




capitalization String Number of Characters Permuted LP Difficulty Number of Chunks Mixed Character Unsentence-like **Pronounceable** Start Symbol Symbol New New New New New New



н

Para796951/ Aolprdfdes3! Wnicolerii3) Boyldfuea1#@ Adfdehf9876% Amkolpdns98) NLicolekd30-Nicoeldksj0) GHFHHHFDn36@ Ndfdhfaa24#@



Original Password q856VW

	Symbol start:	0	0
Num	ber of Chunks:	0	0
Number	of Characters:	2	2
_	nsentence-like apitalization:	1	1
Mixed Cha	racter String:	1	0
	Pronounceable:	0	0
Total	LP Difficulty:	4	3
	<pre># of Desktop keystrokes:</pre>	11	10
	<pre># of Android Keystrokes:</pre>	11	10
# of iP	ad Keystrokes:	11	10
	entropy:	39	33

Permuted Password VWq856

0	Symbol start
0	Number of Chunks
2	Number of Characters
1	Unsentence-like capitalization
0	Mixed Character String
0	Pronounceable
3	Total LP Difficulty
10	# of Desktop keystrokes
10	# of Android Keystrokes
10	# of iPad Keystrokes
33	entropy

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 $\binom{\textit{Length}}{\textit{Upper}}\binom{\textit{Length}}{(\textit{Upper}-\textit{Lower})}\binom{\textit{Length}}{(\textit{Upper}-\textit{Lower}-\textit{Numbers})}$

Prior Work: Entry Times

Order	String	Mean Entry Time	Length	Key- strokes	Shifts	Screen depth changes
9	3.bH1o	5.97	6	11	1	4
1	5c2'Qe	6.32	6	11	1	4
3	m3)61fHw	6.98	8	11	1	2
10	a7t?C2#	9.45	7	14, 13*	1, 2*	6, 4*
5	p4d46*3TxY	13.13	10	18	2	6
4	d51)u4;X3wrf	13.75	12	19	1	6
6	<u>q80<u c2mv<="" u=""></u></u>	15.02	10	19	2	7
7	6n04%Ei'Hm3V	18.20	12	24	3	9
8	4i_55fQ\$2Mnh30	19.28	14	25	2	9
2	m#o)fp^2aRf207	22.52	14	24	1	10

*(iPhone, iPad)

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9	3.bH1o	5.97	6	11	1	4
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2	m#o)fp^2aRf207	22.52	14	24	1	10

*(iPhone, iPad)

Modified Shannon Entropy

Kuo, 2006

$$Score = \begin{cases} Log_{10}((Num Characters)^{Length}) & Not in dictionary \\ 0 & In dictionary \end{cases}$$